Borgerbtc Si j'ai bien compris le vault ce sera ici : https://vote.realtoken.network/asset ?
non ce sera -> https://vote.realtoken.network/dao/incentive
[RIP00001] Activation of the first incentive epoch for the Realtoken DAO
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W The current proposal may appear to favor large holders, which could discourage smaller REG holders from participating. To create a more inclusive and fair system, I propose introducing several mechanisms:
there is no major holder, everyone received 100 REG, there are people who chose to sell and others to TAKE a risk by buying, don't you think that the one who sold made his choice, that the one who decided to do nothing with the 100REG took the risk of not earning free money and that the one who bought at a price took a risk with his money?
everyone started from the same point and made decisions, there is no reason to disadvantage them for small holders who did not take a risk, that remains my opinion, but if there had not been the top 10 who had bought (for several thousand $) the REG would not be at the current price but rather close to 0.1 or less.
When the soon will be convertible into REG, will you buy all the REG sold?
If not then the price will drop, will you be happy that the price of REG drops?
If you buy all the REG that are sold then you will be a big carrier, will you agree not to win proportionally to the small carrier who will not have done anything more with their 100 REG?
I think we must keep in mind that the small and the big are important, for the voting power, you have solutions to have more voting power with less REG
W A rewards system could be implemented where small holders (e.g., those holding less than 100 REG) receive a proportionally higher bonus for their participation. This would encourage small holders to engage while still offering attractive incentives for larger holders. The system could operate on a tiered basis, with slightly higher yields for smaller participants.
I think you are on the wrong track, here is why:
if I have 1000 REG, and therefore I earn less than those who have only 100, then it will happen that I will create 10 addresses with 100 REG, to earn more.
Result the system has not solved anything but created much more complexity to read the addresses and who holds what
W To prevent users from creating multiple addresses to cheat and maximize rewards, a decentralized identity verification system like BrightID could be utilized. This would ensure that each person can participate with only one address, maintaining privacy and decentralization.
this adds a layer of complexity and brings an unnecessary level of risk, by having to give the identity somewhere or prove who you are you will strongly reduce the participation, therefore the interest therefore the value, not to mention the risk of data leakage, and other problems linked to the linking of address with an identity.
The REG is not Realtokens, it is a totally free utility token and must be able to be used by whoever wishes for a maximum decentralization of the DAO and given the way to any holder without discrimination.
Reducing the gap with the increase in the number of REG held only has a negative impact, it encourages not to have more, it encourages to sell the REG that we receive in order not to go up a level and earn less
W To discourage the creation of multiple addresses and frequent token transfers to manipulate the system, penalties for frequent REG transfers before incentive epochs could be introduced. For example, higher transaction fees or a “cooldown” period (during which transferred tokens are ineligible for rewards) could be applied. This would deter manipulation attempts and keep the rewards fair.
clea looks like something complicated and useless for v1, not to mention that it limits the freedom to dispose of your REGs as you wish.
v2 will have a system that encourages to keep blocked REGs without hindering the freedom to dispose of them as you wish
W A loyalty bonus could also be given to holders who keep their REG locked for multiple consecutive epochs. This would encourage long-term participation, reduce frequent transfers, and help maintain stability in engagement.
By combining these mechanisms, we could not only encourage small holder participation but also ensure that the system remains fair, sustainable, and resistant to fraud attempts.
it's just to encourage to keep lock, but it's not on the agenda of v1, too much complexity too much dev work for a temporary system and is there to take a first step forward and show the concept.
Too much complexity will scare away new users.
I don't agree with you on the point of the big carriers, if the big ones put thousands of $ on the table or even millions, that they didn't receive all their REG for free then they must have the same rights as the small ones.
Think for 1 minute, if the valuation of all the REG is $500 million, so 1 REG is $1, how are you going to do a x10 you will have to add 4.5 billion, do you think that it's the small carriers who will add all this money in the REG?
So if you have money and we tell you the more REG you have the less you will earn, are you going to put these big amounts?
A fair balance is needed, and two things must be separated, the voting right which must not grow as quickly with the number of REGs to avoid governance attacks (V2 will have mechanics for this), and on the other hand the invested capital which yields a return, here $1 must be able to yield the same thing regardless of whether you have put 1000 x $1 or only 100 x $1
Shall we wait until the conversion SOON <-> REG is available so we have REG, lock them up and vote?
Belle initiative, je vais suivre et m'y intéresser. Merci encore pour ce projet.
-RP-
no, second FAQ question https://wiki.realtoken.community/en/DAO/FAQ
Hi, when and where do we need to pool to benefits from this ?
Semence Hi, when and where do we need to pool to benefits from this ?
Please read the proposal, the messages before yours and the wiki:
Timeline:
- Day 1-7: Community vote
- Day 8-9: Queue period
- Day 10-14: Subscription period
- Day 15 - Week 6: Lock period
- End of week 6: Bonus distribution and possibility of withdrawal
UPMP Je voulais savoir à partir de quand cette proposition sera soumis à un vote sur Tally ?
généralement ça reste 1 semaine a cette étape, donc possiblement au vote pour 7 jours a partir de la semaine prochaine
The proposal will stay in the discussion stage until possibly next week. Then it will move to voting and start the above described timeline.
Consider also looking up when and where to vote if you want this proposal to pass.
Je dois avouer que la pente est un peu raide pour un premier vote, et pour les personnes qui ne sont pas dans le coeur du projet.
Il faut certainement passer un peu plus de temps sur le wiki pour comprendre les enjeux derrière le vote, car lorsqu'on lit cela en première lecture en néophyte : Transférer les fonds du contrat de trésorerie du RMMv3 vers la Trésorerie de la DAO (!!! paiement de 20% à AAVE DAO)
On pourrait comprendre que ce sont les fonds des prêteurs qui sont transférés vers la DAO.
Super content de participer aux premiers pas de la DAO. Et merci à l'équipe pour le travail de vulgarisation du Wiki.
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I have updated the checklist, in view of the comments it seems to me that on the form you are ok and therefore that the format, the information are ok to be pushed to the vote when the time comes in order to decide on a yes or no
It will still remain as is until Monday during the day, then we publish the Onchain proposal.
The proposal will be consultable without the possibility of voting for 1 day to allow it to be checked and alerted if it is with an error, misleading, malicious, it can be canceled before the start of the vote, once the vote starts it is no longer possible to cancel it before the Queue period.
J'ai mis a jours la check liste, aux vues des commentaire il me semble que sur la forme vous estes ok et donc que le format, les infos sont ok pour etre pousser aux vote le moment venu afin de vous prononcé sur un oui ou non
Elle vas encore rester en l'état jusqu'à Lundi dans la journée, puis nous publions la proposal Onchain.
La proposal sera consultable sans possibilité de vote 1 jours pour permettre de la vérifier et alerter si elle es avec une erreur, trompeuse, malicieuse, elle pourra être annulé avant le début du vote, une fois le vote démarrer ils est plus possible de l'annulé avant la période de Queue.