RealToken DAO PowerVoting Models: Community Feedback Request

Teugos

Ces schémas sont vraiment utiles. Ils montrent clairement que les solutions 1 et 2 ne sont pas idéales.
La solution 3 se démarque par sa linéarité, ce qui la rend facile à comprendre rapidement.
Les solutions 4 à 6 semblent mieux correspondre à nos objectifs. Personnellement, j'ai une légère préférence pour la solution 6.

Yohann76

paul I'd probably go a step further and suggest that we shouldn't have a baselevel multiplier just for tenancy in a pool - I think we should allow the decay to go all the way to near 0 based on a weighted relative distance on either side of the current price.

I quite agree with that,

It's a slightly more drastic change, which really forces you to put liquidity in the right place.

But it's consistent with the new calculation method based on an exponential curve.

EzSwim

I think all algorithm from 4 to 6 are on the right track.
However I have one issue with #6. If i understood correctly, the incentive never goes to 0 (or way to slowly). It feels like we are rewarding those who would put there REG liquidity at 10 when the market price is at 0.5. It kinda of defeats the purpose we are trying to set here.

As a rule of thumb (that I pulled out of my hat), there is no reason for liquidity to be deposited at more than 3x the market price. The huge crash we had from 1.5 to 0.1717 (let say it was divided by 10) didn't happen in a day and it was a special case (we released the kraken known as SOON).
If you look in "normal market" (whatever that means) conditions high volatility is around 30% per day. Therefore I feel like rewarding up until 10x that amount is enough. No threshold (hate that word now), but we could have a curve that decays utils it reaches 0 at +200% and -200% of the market price.

Benoist-Not-for-sale

EzSwim The omportant thing is to encourage people to provide liquidity in range, i dont' think is is that useful to cancel out power of those who are (very) far from the price but rather keeping their power close to a ratio similar to a holder who has idle REG in his wallet.

Keep in mind that (if I understand correctly) that it won't constantly monitor positions but will be used for snapshots so it doesn't need to be very sophisticated.
One can be very close from the price at snapshot #1 and more distant at snapshot #2 it doesn't really matter if his power is almost the same.

threshold
threshold
threshold

EzSwim

paul I'd probably go a step further and suggest that we shouldn't have a baselevel multiplier just for tenancy in a pool - I think we should allow the decay to go all the way to near 0 based on a weighted relative distance on either side of the current price.

On one hand I think that is what I would prefer as well.

Not sure about this quote:

paul the implication is that we're seeking to reward user behaviour that maintains quite narrow liquidity bands at lower USD costs.

I feel like I agree with the first part (reward marrow liquidity bands) but I don't get what lower USD costs means

paul

EzSwim lower USD costs

Mistake - "lower USD prices"!

Teugos

Benoist-Not-for-sale used for snapshots so it doesn't need to be very sophisticated.

True !

Teugos

Benoist-Not-for-sale threshold
threshold
threshold

Teugos

Benoist-Not-for-sale So you mean we could go for the 2 simple models which are nb 3 & 4 ?

EzSwim

Benoist-Not-for-sale The omportant thing is to encourage people to provide liquidity in range, i dont' think is is that useful to cancel out power of those who are (very) far from the price but rather keeping their power close to a ratio similar to a holder who has idle REG in his wallet.

We agree on that, that's why I said a bonus of 0. But maybe it was a poor choice of word. an increase of 0 or a multiplier of 1 might be more explicit of what i meant.

Benoist-Not-for-sale

Teugos I don't think it's necessary to have absurd multipliers since genuine LP will be around current price at the time of snapshot.
It depends if we want to favor "professional" LPs wich will actively manage and will more likely be very close to the price at the expense of average users who will deposit just for participating.
It's not really about simplicity - even though it would be great so have a simple model so anyone can check his positions and his Voting Power - but rather softening the curve to make is "cool" so that someone having an offset of +/- 10% won't be too much disavantaged.

If some were to cheat by moving constantly their liquidity above/under the price by 20% we won't be able to properly discourage them anyway (unless having an active monitoring)

Teugos

That's fair, but the real question is: what brings the most value to the DAO?
Should we prioritize LPs that optimize performance and stay close to the price? Or design a system that encourages broader participation, even if less precise?
What’s more useful long-term:

rewarding only the most active and technical contributors,
or ensuring inclusivity and simplicity to foster a wider base of DAO-aligned LPs?

At the end of the day, we need a model that aligns incentives with the DAO’s goals, whether that's precision, engagement, fairness, or resilience.
Maybe the right balance isn't about punishing or favoring, but about encouraging healthy behavior without making the system fragile or too complex.

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